 |
| Life and Death of the Public Sphere in the Soviet Union |
| by Viktor Voronkov |
|
My article deals with the phenomenon of the public sphere in the USSR and its transformation in the process of revolutionary changes in Russia at the end of the 20th century. In the USSR this phenomenon looked very unusual for western man. By defining its structure and logic we can give a clue to understanding the social processes of the soviet and post-soviet era. So, let us see what the main characteristics of the Soviet public sphere were.
First of all, we need to draw a line between public and private spaces. There is a considerable discussion considering the term "public sphere". [1] In most cases, following Hanna Arendt and Jürgen Habermas, researchers see it as a space, where citizens can discuss different issues without state's interference. It is clear, that we cannot follow this approach in the case of the USSR, because it was virtually impossible for a Soviet person to speak out against the state in public.
|
Taking this fact into consideration, we should rather use the term "public sphere" in the frame of a dramaturgical approach as it was suggested by Irwin Hoffman and Philip Ariez, i.e. as the sphere of sociability, communicative space in general, excluding private space. The private sphere here is limited to the family (border cases such as a company of friends belong, according to Ariez, to the "semi-private" sphere).
It seems rather difficult to draw a line between public and private in the Soviet Union. Research of that society leads to the conclusion that the private sphere (in the common sense) did not exist, not at least for the three decades of the Stalin regime. Even the physical space for private life disappeared (and started a slow revival only in 1950's, when mass-production of cheaply-built living blocks began). In cities people lived in communalki (a large flat inhabited by a big number of families sharing bathroom and kitchen facilities), and were subject to constant government control. Eavesdropping and peeping through keyholes became usual practices of communal living, a regular part of everyday life. Denunciation could be expected not only from neighbours, but also from family members. New norms and values were imposed by the state, especially upon the young generation: e.g. denunciations were turned into heroic deeds after Pavlik Morozov (one of cult figures of Soviet mythology: a young pioneer who in 1920's lead an expropriation campaign in his own village and wrote denunciations of his well-off family members). [2]
A homogenized life-style was a must, and every form of individualism was condemned. It was appreciated not to show any difference in life-style (slogans of those days exemplify this: "I am exactly like others", "Do not show off", "Soviet man has nothing to hide from his comrades"). Every aspect of private life could become the subject of official "public" discussion, with consequent sanctions (for example: party penalties for adultery). Thus, the border between public and private was transparent. There were no conditions for private life and for private discourse that could be alternative to the ones imposed by the authorities. People were persecuted for any attempt to doubt the dominant ideology. This explains why there was no principal difference between public and private spheres as far as communication is concerned.
For a better understanding of the specificities of the USSR's communicative space, I would like to bring to attention the way in which social relationships were regulated in the Soviet society in general. As this society developed, a complex system of written and unwritten rules was established, which reflected the parallel existence of formal and normal law. In Stalin's time, written law pretended to regulate all spheres of activities of soviet citizens (if the permanent violation of these rules by the state itself is not taken into consideration). However, even under conditions of hard repression for violation of formal rules, conventions adjusted to the Soviet reality were formed and gradually legitimised.
When making a general analysis of the last decades of the Soviet period it is hard not to notice that the informal sphere (i.e. the sphere of out-of-law regulation, based on conventions) started to prevail over the sphere regulated by written law. Generally speaking, during the last 30 years of the USSR a base for the development of usual law was being formed: the informal economy, entrepreneurial activities, and family businesses served as preparations for reforms. Almost all of these activities were regulated by conventions. Though in every modern society these two spheres of regulation are separated, in the USSR the predominance of the law of custom (conventions) lead to fundamental shifts in public life. [3]
Starting with Khrushev's time it became obvious that conventions regulated most parts of social life in the Soviet Union. It concerned not only the everyday life of average citizens, but also the functioning of the state mechanism itself. For example, according to some estimations, by the end of the Soviet era around 2/3 of all resources were distributed not according to official regulations, but on the basis of administrative trade, i.e. according to conventions formed by the (communist party) elite, which appeared to be more efficient than formal laws. [4]
As two generations of Soviet citizens followed conventions rather than written laws, their mentality was radically transformed. Social life went through fundamental changes. Conventions became to be recognized by all members of the society since they were more effective. However strange it may seem, legitimisation of conventions supported formal laws, even though they mutually excluded each other. Written Soviet law was so ineffective in regulating social and economic relationships that the government had to accept "silently" their citizens' out-of-law initiatives, to raise the efficiency of these processes. As is often said, the laws in Russia were always so strict that they were manageable only under the condition that their execution was not required.
As long as the legitimacy of both types of law and the co-existence of contradictory rules threatened the stability of Soviet regime, and the sphere regulated by written law became more and more limited (as it was increasingly questioned and criticised), a mechanism compensating for the narrowing of the space of life activities (still regulated by the norms of written law) was required. The long tradition of silencing "real life" in the sphere of communication, i.e. in the official public sphere, served as such a mechanism. Oleg Vite, a Russian political scientist, was the first to pay attention to the specific character of public space in the USSR in this regard.
As a rule, only the sphere regulated by formal laws was subject to open public discussions. Everything determined by conventions was taboo. Despite the fact that conventions regulated most of the social processes in Soviet society, in the official public space almost exclusively those things were discussed that belonged to the domain of written rules. E.g. a foreigner reading Soviet press or talking to an average citizen formally, would only get confirmation of propaganda slogans about the wonderful life of Soviet people. Ideological clichés used in the public sphere were in striking contrast with real life. For example, officially every person lived according to the "Communist ethic code" and was "honest", while in reality, following Simon Kordonskiy apt expression, everybody was stealing and those who didn't benefited from the stolen. The public version of Soviet reality was a myth, which had nothing in common with people's everyday experience. However, to strangers Soviet citizens talked "as they were supposed to", not because of fear of being punished, but due to a silent agreement with the state.
As real life was absolutely different from its official public image, it could not be discussed in the official public sphere, but the possibility itself to discuss it had already occurred. In the last 30 years of the Soviet era a specific public sphere, where everything could be discussed, came into being. This communicative space could be called a private-public sphere. As an informal sphere, it was strictly separated from official public life. Its emergence marked the end of the Stalin era. This new private-public sphere, which appeared in the form of nightly coversations among close friends in the kitchens of Soviet intelligentsia, soon became an important element of everyday life. Talking about private-public space, we assume that the non-conformist movement (the underground) was a particular variant, so we do not need to discuss this phenomenon separately.
At first, the private- public sphere in the USSR reminds us of that in the modern democratic society, i.e. of the sphere where citizens can criticize the government or, at least, discuss important issues outside of it. However, concerning the Soviet Union, it means something different - "the other public sphere", such as official public places, was out of reach, and the discussions taking place in the private-public sphere were not reflected in the official media. As I have already mentioned, in the official public sphere the country lived according to written law. Any mention of problems of real life was possible only with reference to the "relics of capitalism" that only remained "some-times and some-where".
It would be a mistake to think that the private-public sphere was a communication space only for certain social groups. Every Soviet citizen -and members of the authorities were not an exception- communicated in both public spheres, understood the difference, and never mixed up the rules of the game (this is what is often called the "social schizophrenia" of "homo sovieticus"). Two people talking to each other as friends and as "communists" would communicate in distinctly different ways.
Both the citizens and the state, in silent agreement, recognised the border between the official and "private" public sphere. In the history of the Soviet Union there were not so many cases where this border was deliberately crossed. To make it clear how "sacred" this border was, let me remind you about political dissidents who tried to transfer the issues discussed in the private-public sphere into the official public sphere, i.e. those things which were officially non-discussible (e.g. appeal "Follow your laws!"). The state severely punished them for crossing the border, while the rest of the society silently assumed solidarity with the state.
Below I suggest a simple scheme that demonstrates the development of the relationship of the public and private spheres in the Soviet society in its specificities.
The private-public sphere in Soviet society
After Stalin's death the Soviet society went through a series of qualitative changes, leading to principal transformations in the structure of public space. Firstly, the Communist party established a precedent of criticising the regime by condemning Stalin's cult and the purges of the Stalin era. Secondly, the fear of being persecuted and punished was reduced, so it gradually became a common thing to discuss "the negative sides of life" in every social group. Thirdly, with regard to mass production of cheaply built living blocks, some conditions for private life were created in the cities. People moved from communalki to private apartments.
Thus, in 1950s a physical space where some form of privacy could develop appeared in Russian cities. Though privacy itself did not yet play an important role in social life, in that period it was opposed not to the official public sphere, but to the "other" public sphere. The typical example showing relations between these two spheres is the "kitchen of intelligentsia", where critical attitudes to the regime were concentrated and from which political dissidents originated.
The intellectuals' struggle for the inclusion of a wider range of topics into discussions in the official public sphere lead to the freedom of speech in he Perestroika period and the disappearance of taboo zones. The private-public sphere almost disappeared. The border was demolished. The communication space gradually acquired a more familiar shape for the western researcher. At the same time, the growing importance of privacy lead to the formation of a more solid border separating private and public spheres. Consequently, private life became less open for discussion.
Though in the last decade of the Soviet era the public-private sphere became far less important because of the growing freedom of speech, the border did not disappear completely from the mentality of people, whose socialization as youth was determined by Soviet conditions. It explains why you can still meet people who consider talking to a stranger an official public event. Thus "Soviet Man" habitually chooses that system of communication rules, which he is used to follow in the public sphere. These rules determine the choice and the manner of treatment of subjects that should be discussed.
The reason for this is not that verbalisation of certain topics is a taboo. The official public sphere is not considered a place for discussing "real life". A person whose socialization started in Soviet society, is well aware of the fact what should and what should not be discussed, what is out of place, and what is not. Ignoring this fact in the process of communication unavoidably leads to in the creation of myths and artefacts distorting the adequacy of our ideas of the society.
Here is an illustration of this statement, taken from my own research practice. Several years ago I researched the problems of Russian emigrants in Berlin. I kept in touch with a number of informants and was waiting for the moment when they started to trust me and tell me the truth about informal and illegal practices among emigrants. Once I heard from one of my informants, that a German sociologist, specialising in emigration problems, had recently interviewed him. To my impatient question, what he had told the sociologist, he proudly answered: "Don't worry, I told him everything as it was necessary to tell".
The results of research among the representatives of the post-soviet generation (people under 30-35) confirm the above-mentioned assumption. These people, as compared to previous generations, have passed through a secondary socialisation in post-soviet conditions. Their outlook on life and social behaviour was formed (at the age of 16-24) during the revolutionary events of 1980-90, which were followed by radical transformation of the society. This generation rarely shows the above-mentioned "schizophrenia." There is no discourse border to be seen any more.
What are most significant changes in the Russian society over the last ten years regarding the perspective of the function of public space? I do not share the ideas that the system of law has been completely destroyed and has become an "anomaly". On the contrary, I would like to make the following assumptions.
First of all, no introduction of lawlessness occurred. It has mainly been formal law that has changed, and it stayed as ineffective as it was in Soviet times. Secondly, the rules of everyday behaviour changed very little. The illusion of changes is created by the fact that the primary use of conventions dominating over formal law became evident. Here we can still see the controversy of the two systems. For example, in the case of a commercial argument or a conflict, businessmen prefer not to go to court, which does not fulfil its duties, but rather apply to a much more effective social institute of "authoritative people" (known as "bandits") that can convince a debtor to pay back, or solve problems of a breach of agreement or contract by a partner. Informal institutions have taken over from formal ones in many spheres where the latter do not function normally. For example, as 20 years ago, now a Russian citizen cannot obtain credit in a bank (in spite of the fact that banks are created for this purpose). Thus, to great surprise of western people, there is still an informal institute of obtaining credit from each other (all Russian people always were, are, and will be borrowing money from relatives and friends).
In Russia, formal laws and conventions do not get closer to each other, as it would be typical for a country with a market economy. Rather, they have a tendency to co-exist. For example, according to certain conventions, employees should be given the opportunity to steal from the company now and then, but at the same time, stealing should be strictly forbidden by the regulations, so that the people "would not exceed the limits", as Oleg Vite mentions.
The dominant discourse of catastrophy about the situation in Russia is caused by the destruction of borders in the public sphere. There are no limits to discussing "real life" in the "official" public sphere anymore. This enormous flow of new topics and subjects. which before were only discussed in the public-private sphere, creates the image of dramatic changes. However, the changes occurred not in real life, but rather in the made-up official image of real life, actively promoted in the Soviet public sphere.
Addressing the issue of "international relationships" can easily prove this. In the official public sphere of the USSR the discourse of "friendship between nations", "internationalism", "equality of all nations" prevailed. In the "real world" (i.e. in the private-public sphere) the life of every citizen was constantly influenced by the state's policy regarding certain "nationalities". A person could lose or benefit from his/her nationality depending on geographical territory, historical changes and political voluntarism. Discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin was widespread and concerned the most important aspects of life, such as work, education, and freedom of travel. The attitude to national differences was determined by racism in its modern meaning, which was a dominant discourse in society. Under the influence of this official power discourse all nationalities were placed in a hierarchy in the mind of every Soviet citizen, which brought about discrimination and xenophobia in everyday life. This issue was actively discussed in the public-private sphere. But judging by the official public sphere, there was not a single case of xenophobia in the country.
When the border between the two public spheres disappeared, racism entered the official public sphere, where it could not exist previously, neither as a topic for discussion, nor as a lawful practice. Public discourse about ethnicity has lost its neutral tone. Mass media started to use the racist discourse, often without realising it. Everyday-life racism - which before was "unconsciously" supported by academic educational discourse, - entered the newspapers and political discourse, and it served as a basis for discrimination by government institutions.
Although, according to J. Habermas, economic and political systems colonise a person's life-experience5, the influence of those systems on people's lives was not that evident in Soviet society because the two public spheres were separated. Soviet people were partly immune to ideology, due to the controversy between the official public sphere and the private-public sphere, a result of the very existence of the above-mentioned frontiers. It is a matter of fact that further generations of Russian people will become products of new state system, whose perspective will coincide with "the West".
The frontiers of public space are constantly shifting. The modern state has a tendency to occupy more and more private space of its citizens, to colonise their perception of life. It assumes many functions that used to belong to communities (it takes care about children, senior citizens, education, housing). What happens to people in such conditions? Before, they belonged to community groups, which meant that most of their needs were satisfied inside these communities. As the state assumed these functions, people's identities were transformed. Before they identified with a community or a small ethnic group they belonged to (and soviet people- with a real social network), and those formations fulfilled the duties of various social institutions. Now they identify more and more with the state, so we can speak about an identity of citizenship.
The role of the public sphere under these conditions becomes extremely important. We can see that through mass media and education the society is indoctrinated with discourse formed by the elite. However, there are no rules in social life, there are only tendencies, and these tendencies appear to be quite contradictory. It is obvious, for example, how dissatisfaction with the state, today leads towards the destruction of the public sphere. People nowadays stop voting at elections, reading newspapers, taking part in public life, getting interested in what is going on "there, at the top". The elite lives its own life, while the society tries to find its own strategies for survival, paying little attention to formal regulations and restrictions, and not counting anymore on the state's support. In any case, we can conclude that the Soviet public space as a phenomenon is dying together with successive generations of Soviet people.
NOTES:
1 - Different approaches to the phenomenon of private/public can be found in: Weintraub, J. The Theory and Politics of the Public/Private Distinction // Public and Private in Thought and Practice / J.Weintraub, K.Kumar (eds.). Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press, 1996. P.1-41.
2 - According to Oleg Vite, denunciations are typical for societies regulated by formal law, and bribes for those regulated by conventions (O.Vite Can electorate be people's enemies? (Thoughts of adequate electoral behaviour and factors it depends on// Ethics of success, 9, 1996. _.58-71). Thus, Stalin's time was a period when formal law prevailed, and starting with Khrushev's era Russian society is regulated by conventions
3 - O.Vite
4 - I would like to draw readers' attention to he work of Simon Kordonsky, explaining how the power really functioned in the Soviet Union, what was regulated by formal rules and what by informal ones. (S. Kordonsky. Markets of power. Administrative markets of USSR and Russia. Moscow, 2000)
5 - orig. German. "Erlebniswelt"
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
